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“Genetic Load”:  
How the Architects of the Modern Synthesis Became 
Trapped in a Scientific Ideology 
 
Alexandra Soulier1 
Abstract  
The term “genetic load” first emerged in a paper written in 1950 by the geneticist H. Muller. 
It is a mathematical model based on biological, social, political and ethical arguments describ-
ing the dramatic accumulation of disadvantageous mutations in human populations that will 
occur in modern societies if eugenic measures are not taken. The model describes how the 
combined actions of medical and social progress will supposedly impede natural selection 
and make genes of inferior quality likely to spread across populations – a process which in 
fine loads their progress. Genetic load is based on optimal fitness and emerges from a “typo-
logical view” of evolution. This model of evolution had previously, however, been invalidated 
by Robert Wright and Theodosius Dobzhansky who, as early as 1946, showed that polymor-
phism was the rule in natural populations. The blooming and persistence of the concept of 
genetic load, after its theoretical basis had already expired, are a historical puzzle. This per-
sistence reveals the intricacy of science and policy-making in eugenic matters. The Canguil-
hemian concept of ‘scientific ideology’ (1988) is used along with the concept of ‘immutable 
mobile’ (Latour 1986) and compared with the concept of ‘co-production’ (Jasanoff 1998), to 
provide complementary perspectives on this complex phenomenon. 
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_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In population genetics, the genetic load model describes a reduction in the selective value of 
a population, compared to a population in which all individuals have the same, most favored 
genotype. 
In 1937, J. B. S. Haldane had already proposed that deleterious mutations, regardless 
of their severity, could drastically decrease the selective value of a population. This conclu-
sion draws upon the theory of hidden variability in natural populations, which states that 
recessive mutations eventually show up causing genetic drift. The idea, if not new, found its 
                                                 
1 Alexandra Soulier is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Philosophy at Uppsala University – Center for Re-
search Ethics and Bioethics – Address: Husargatan 3, BMC, Entrance A11, Uppsala, Sweden and Univer-
sité Paul Sabatier-Inserm (UMR1027) – Address: 37 allées Jules Guesde 31000 Toulouse, France. E-mail: 
alexandra.soulier@gmail.com 
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mature formulation in 1950. In Our load of mutations, Henry J. Muller coins the expression 
‘genetic load’ to express his concern for the human species which was taking a tragic turn – 
biologically speaking – under the combined actions of medicine and politics of solidarity. Be-
cause modern systems of assistance and care prevent the elimination of less favored geno-
types, they allow disadvantageous mutations to spread in populations. In turn, this accumu-
lation of deleterious genes impedes the work of natural selection even further. With the ac-
cumulation of deleterious mutations, Muller states, a mechanism of degeneration has been 
triggered that ultimately threatens the survival of the human species. Eugenics is proposed 
as the unique solution to the problem of genetic load. 
From a historical perspective, however, the emergence of the theme of genetic load 
and its success as a scientific topic are highly problematic. Genetic load is a mathematical 
model that measures a deficit in adaptation and is based on optimal fitness: it emerges from 
the “typological view” of evolution, according to which “variation is simply noise with no 
inherent meaning” (Parichy 2005, 476). This model of evolution was, however, experimen-
tally invalidated by Robert Wright and Theodosius Dobzhansky, who showed that polymor-
phism was the rule in natural populations four years before the term genetic load was coined 
(Wright & Dobzhansky 1946). How, then, to explain the persistence of genetic load as a con-
cept when its theoretical basis had already expired? 
The present paper is an attempt to solve this historical puzzle. Our analysis is theoreti-
cally grounded within a corpus of studies that has documented how extra-scientific concerns 
get conveyed into scientific production, thereby blurring the boundaries between societal 
concerns and scientific topics. The concept of ‘scientific ideology’, developed by Canguilhem 
(1988), provides a framework for understanding how the concept of genetic load could be 
produced within two distinct contexts: population genetics and Evolutionary Humanism. The 
transportation of the concept between these two corpora of writings is apprehended 
through the concept of the “immutable mobile”, developed by Latour (1986). While focusing 
on scientific writings gives no clue as to the persistence of the concept, analysis of genetic 
load conceived as a theme of science fiction in humanist essays explains how the metaphor 
of the load and its scientific modelling served both as a vivid background and a truth effect 
justifying eugenic-oriented policies.  
Using genetic load as a case study, we conclude by showing the fecundity and limits of 
the Canguilhemian approach, in comparison with the more recent approach of ‘co-produc-
tion’ supported by Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
Genetic load: a scientific ideology 
An epistemic puzzle  
 
‘Genetic load’ is a mathematical model for determining the rate of evolution in populations. 
It was developed in the field of quantitative genetics. This branch of population genetics con-
centrates on the ways that individual variation in genotype and environment contributes to 
variance in phenotype.2 Through quantitative genetics, the challenge is to reconcile the dis-
continuous nature of Mendelian inheritance with the continuous variation pictured in evolu-
tion. Due to the complexity of the population-level processes examined and to the long time 
scales over which analyzed evolutionary processes occur, mathematical models are devel-
oped that do not directly explain how evolution proceeds, but provide information on the 
possibility of various scenarios (Plutynski 2004).  
                                                 
2 R. Fisher introduced the term “variance” and proposed a formal analysis of variance in a 1918 article 
“The Correlation Between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance”. His first application 
of the analysis of variance was published in 1921. Analysis of variance became widely known after being 
included in Fisher's 1925 book, Statistical Methods for Research Workers. 
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Model building is not, however, without consequence. Although population genetics 
may benefit from the simplifying value of the biostatisticians’ assumptions (Crow 2001), 
mathematical models also act as idealized constructions that embark scientists into “fictional 
states of affairs” (Godfrey-Smith 2009; Rao & Nanjundiah 2011). Idealization is a cognitive 
operation that allows for treating things as if they possessed features they do not have but 
would be concrete if real. Mathematical models of early quantitative genetics relied on dif-
ferent kinds of assumptions - some of them more powerful than others (Servedio et al. 2014). 
To consider populations as if they were infinite3 is, for example, a logistical kind of assump-
tion: it allows for identifying the effects of certain determinants by placing them in a simpli-
fied context. Nobody believes that populations are infinite. However, when biostasticians 
count genes as if they were differently colored beans in a bag, all independent one from an-
other and without interacting effects, the assumption is not logistical but critical. In this case, 
the relevance of the model depends on a certain conception of evolution, which states that 
different genetic compositions at a single locus are associated with specific traits in the or-
ganism. Evolution is therefore portrayed as a statistical game where single alleles have con-
stant and absolute selective values and where mutation is the exchange of one kind of bean 
for another.4 In this model, each allele is assigned an absolute fitness value; adaptation is 
understood as a process of selection of the fittest allele and evolution is seen as a process 
leading to uniform populations composed only of the most favored genotypes – all identical, 
all homozygous. These mathematical models rely on the assumption that evolution results in 
a state of absolute conformity among the fittest individuals within a population. 
Consequently, early quantitative genetics fits into the scheme of typological thinking, 
which can be defined as a preoccupation with equilibrium rather than change (Lewontin 
1974) and homogeneity over variability (Dreuil 1996). The mathematical model of the genetic 
load makes no exception to the typological rule, relying on the predominance of uniformity. 
Because, for sufficiently large populations, the rate at which a favorable gene spreads is de-
termined essentially by the strength of selection, natural selection (if not impeded) should 
gradually eliminate any less favored genotype until the fittest becomes the rule. In this model 
where, all things being equal, variability tends to be ruled out, genetic load is nothing but a 
product of a disturbance in the forces. Without the imbalance that naturally favors the selec-
tion of the fittest, the genetic load model predicts the explosion of hidden variability, the 
spreading of genes of inferior quality and the dissolution of the human species. According to 
Muller’s model, once the mutation load of the human species has exerted too much pressure, 
the unit of the species will lose its consistency, its contours will shade, and the only connec-
tion of our descendants with mankind will be the historical one (Muller 1950, 146). There will 
be no more Humans. Under an unbearable pressure from mutations, not only would the spe-
cies lose its chance for enhancement but also its consistency as a unit, and would therefore 
disappear. This potential implosion of the species reveals another typological view according 
to which species are morphological kinds threatened by variability (Amundson 1998). This 
idea contrasts with population thinking; according to which species are aggregates of indi-
viduals with a profile that shows a distribution of characteristics (Mayr 1970; Chung 2003). As 
such, genetic load is the typical product of the typological reasoning of early quantitative 
genetics. Nothing particularly innovative. Nothing worth mentioning. Except that this type 
of thinking had already expired when the genetic load model was formulated.  
Since 1946 and the rise of adaptive polymorphism, typological reasoning had already 
been invalidated. The experiments lead by Wright and Dobzhansky on wild drosophilae had 
                                                 
3 The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (1908), for example, predicts unchanging genotype frequencies in 
a randomly mating, infinitely large population in the absence of selection, migration, or new mutation. 
4 Mayr coined the expression “beanbag genetics” to designate the “gross oversimplification” inher-
ited from classical population genetics that consisted in treating genes as independent entities and 
therefore negating interactions between them (Dronamraju 2010). 
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shown that polymorphism was the rule in natural populations (Dobzhansky 1946; 1949; 
1950). As the two scientists swapped the standard melanogaster (usually used in Morgan’s 
drosophilist group) for the wild pseudoobscura that had not yet been stripped of its natural 
genetic diversity, they were able to study experimentally the process of variation and evolu-
tion in nature. By doing so, they proved that natural populations did not reflect the state of 
uniformity predicted by early quantitative genetics and that variation was crucial for adapta-
tion and fitness. The comforting standards of uniformity were abandoned and variation wel-
comed as an essential feature of the emerging paradigm.5 Without the support of underlying 
data or observations, typological models of evolution were considered devoid of biological 
meaning. As early as 1946, the assumptions critical to typological mathematical models (such 
as genetic load) had already been proved biologically unrealistic. 
Once typological thinking had been discredited, the idea of a genetic load should have 
been disqualified. But the opposite happened. Genetic load persisted long after its theoreti-
cal foundation had already expired. Hence the puzzle.6 Our hypothesis is that genetic load 
persisted as a relevant scientific theme while it served as a scientific support for political, 
social and moral arguments related to eugenics.  
 
The Eugenics behind the History of Genetics 
 
Scientists played a leading role in the history of eugenics. The term eugenics was created in 
the late 19th century by Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, who set himself the task 
of investigating the origins of natural ability so as to improve humanity. He established an 
anthropometric laboratory in London, where biologists and mathematicians who shared the 
same premises developed methods to understand population phenomena. From the rather 
obscure science formed around Galton, eugenics grew rapidly into a worldwide political 
movement.7 
Genetics and eugenics are so closely interwoven that the evolution of the eugenics 
movement can be traced in correlation with theoretical debates between the Mendelians 
and the biometricians (Kevles 1995). Paradigm shifts in eugenics are shown to result from 
major scientific advances in genetic research and population analysis.8 One of these shifts 
                                                 
5 “Dobzhansky, following Chetverikov, viewed species as collections of different local populations. 
Sturtevant, in contrast, had a rigidly typological view of species. As Ernst Mayr later observed, “he 
almost acted as if he considered every species genetically homozygous” (E. Mayr to Provine 1979). In 
other words, Sturtevant treated wild flies as if they were standard, domesticated melanogaster. Dob-
zhansky was always aware of the difference.” (Kohler 1993) 
6 A puzzle that may be assembled differently, as shown by the historian Diane Paul when she asks 
whether eugenics rested on an elementary mistake (Paul, 1987). Eugenists in the first part of the 20th 
century indeed argued explicitly that mental defects were linked to a recessive Mendelian factor, lead-
ing some commentators to suggest that eugenists had been in error if they believed that by sterilizing 
only those individuals thought to be defective, the factor for defectiveness would thereby be elimi-
nated from the population. Paul notes that the eugenics movement expanded after the time when 
the mistaken beliefs had been thoroughly exposed. After reviewing the literature of that time, she 
came to the conclusion that the majority of eugenicists favoured eugenic sterilization, even though 
they knew eugenic methods would not eliminate the “defective factor” from the population as a 
whole. 
7 For accounts of various national eugenics movements, see (Kevles 1995); (Proctor 1988); (Adams 
1990); (Stepan 1991); (Paul 1995). 
8 a) The “mainline” eugenics group, based on the early biometric theories of Pearson and the unit-
character Mendelian theories, dominant between 1880 and 1930; b) the “reform” eugenics group, 
based on experimental chromosome research with animals and mathematical analysis of population 
genetics carried out by the British biologists J.B.S. Haldane, Julian Huxley, and Lancelot Hogben and 
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corresponds to the “reform” eugenics group and refers to a very specific moment in the his-
tory of biology, the modern synthesis. This synthesis reflects the consensus, produced be-
tween 1936 and 1947, about how evolution proceeds. At its heart was the question of 
whether Mendelian genetics could be reconciled with gradual evolution by means of natural 
selection. Evidence for such a rapprochement was primarily gathered from biologists, trained 
in genetics, and mathematicians who proposed models designed to test the compatibility of 
Mendelian genetics and selection theory. 
The new breed of scientists emerging from this movement developed specific eugenic 
views. Although they shared their predecessors’ concern for the degradation of the germ 
plasm and remained convinced that human improvement would proceed better with the de-
ployment of genetic knowledge, their concerns were anchored in liberal social values (Lud-
merer 1972; Kevles 1995) or even Marxist views (Paul 1987; Esposito 2011) that contrasted 
with the early conservative eugenic leadership. They notably insisted on the importance of 
developing a twofold eugenic framework that would take into account genetic as well as 
social factors.9 The theme of genetic load stems from views that promote social progress 
through the manipulation of human heredity. Although the model was presented in popula-
tion genetics, the core argument of genetic load relies on an analysis of the “social obstacles” 
(Muller 1950, 173) that supposedly cause natural selection to malfunction. On the one hand, 
technological advances and social systems are blamed for relieving the pressure of natural 
selection. On the other hand, existing social patterns are assumed to discourage the repro-
duction of higher classes and encourage the reproduction of lower classes, thus producing 
harmful selective effects. Although genetic load describes genetic mechanisms, it is originally 
based on the assumption that our social constructs are inadequate with respect to our evo-
lutionary makeup.10 In Our load of mutations, the burden described by Muller is ours inasmuch 
as we have set up a social environment that both prevents natural selection from operating 
and nurtures unnatural selection.11  
 
Scientific Ideology: 
Exploring the Ideological Contexts and Contents of Science 
 
Is genetic load a response to a scientific inquiry or does it express a social worry? Is it even 
possible to distinguish one from the other? The philosopher Georges Canguilhem (1988) uses 
the term ‘scientific ideologies’ to address statements whose status appears ambivalent or 
ambiguous. In outline, a scientific ideology is an explanatory system that stands in a particu-
lar relationship with science and whose main characteristics can be crystallized around three 
features:  
 
                                                 
the American biologist Herbert S. Jennings, between 1930 and 1960; and c) the “new” eugenics group 
based on the latest research in human biochemical genetics and genetic engineering, dominant since 
the end of the 1960s. 
9 “One major difference between the two groups (the mainline and the reform groups) rests towards 
the effect of environment on character traits, with the reformers more willing to admit that environ-
ment can influence development and that sociological factors must be considered in any eugenic pro-
gram. Thus Charles Davenport would argue that prostitution was caused by a gene defect, whereas a 
reformer might stress sociological factors. Both however would agree that a prostitute should not 
have children.” (Melher 1987, 618). 
10 “Both environmentally and genetically the present state of mankind is unstable, at war with itself”. 
(Huxley 1948, 56)  (our italics).  
11 “Eugenically speaking, our system is characterized by the social promotion of infertility and the ex-
cess fertility of social failure”. (Huxley 1948, 54). 
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- Scientific legitimacy: “Our load of mutations”, Muller’s inaugural paper, was pub-
lished in the American Journal of Human Genetics - a worldwide renowned scientific 
review in 1950. Muller himself was a famous scientist who was notably awarded a 
Nobel Prize in physiology/medicine in 1946. Genetic load became a successful theme 
of research in population genetics from 1958 (at the time the equation was devel-
oped) until the end of the 1960’s when its ideological content started to be refuted. 
 
- Theoretical ambition: The concept of genetic load was constructed during the syn-
thesis of evolutionary studies,12 a period characterized by the ambition to explain sys-
tematically all evolutionary phenomena through the integration of Mendelism and 
Darwinism within a coherent framework (Cain 2009). The architects of the synthesis, 
however, built a project that cannot be confined to its biological dimension since 
evolutionary knowledge was applied to the comprehension of the entire cosmos (Es-
posito 2011) and extended towards a reflection upon the origins of morals and poli-
tics (Delisle 2009). Flanked by so-called Evolutionary Humanism, Neo-Darwinism is 
driven by an immoderate ambition – not only to explain exhaustively how Evolution 
works but also to take control of it (Esposito 2011).  
 
- Scientific crisis: Controversies surrounding the genetic load led to the birth of the 
Neutral Theory and contributed to the end of the synthesis (Dreuil 1996; Rao & 
Nanjundiah 2011). When, in 1966, Richard C. Lewontin and Jack Hubby discovered the 
magnitude of polymorphism in natural populations at the molecular level, they ques-
tioned the sheer phenomenon of genetic load. If populations could carry alleles of 
lower fitness at very many loci, the cost of doing so would be impossibly high, un-
bearable, according to genetic load. Motoo Kimura (1968) proposed a solution which 
allowed both theories to coexist: if the vast majority of evolution changes at the DNA 
sequence molecular level were caused by genetic drift of selectively neutral mutants, 
most mutations would be neutral. The Neutral Theory, while rescuing the genetic 
load concept, denies natural selection at the molecular level. The theoretical cost is 
high. The debate opposing Neutralists and Selectionists marks the fragmentation of 
a unitary theory of evolution and the break-up of the synthesis. 
 
Genetic load meets the criteria of a scientific ideology, as defined by Canguilhem. However, 
the analysis doesn’t stop here: it can start from here. Now that genetic load has been identi-
fied as a potential scientific ideology, its content requires to be examined. What exactly does 
genetic load tells us, at this historical moment, about the normative beliefs of elite scientists, 
who belong to the dominant class of society? Only by exploring the ideological content of 
genetic load, can we explain how geneticists were able to defend, for two decades, a model 
that did not fit with their latest experiments but could fit with their representation of society.  
The concept of ‘scientific ideology’ inspired by Marx, indeed highlights the interplay of inter-
ests in a given situation and arises in response to a major social challenge.  
 
An ideology is an epistemological concept with a polemic function, applied to systems 
of representation which express themselves in the languages of politics, moral, reli-
gion, and metaphysics. These languages claim to express things as they are, whereas 
in reality they are means of protecting and defending a situation, that is, a particular 
                                                 
12 See, for example, (Caplan 1978); (Mayr 1980); (Gould 1983); (Provine 1988); (Burian 1989); (Cain 1993, 
2003, 2009); (Smocovitis1996); (Delisle 2009). 
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structure of the relations between (men among themselves and) 13 men and the things. 
(Canguilhem 1988, 29). 
 
The Canguilhemian approach thus pushes us to look for extra-scientific elements that would 
have been integrated into a scientific reasoning so as to provide ‘truth effects’ to be used by 
scientific experts in their positioning towards social struggles. De facto, in the aftermath of 
World War II, there were no shortage of challenges for an emerging class of ‘experts’ preoc-
cupied by both population phenomena and social policy-making – who had to deal with the 
changing demographic patterns of Western societies, the disruption of social status quo in 
many realms (labor, family, imperialism, etc.) and the threat of eugenics due to the con-
sciousness-raising of Nazi crimes. Exploring the context in which the concept of genetic load 
was formulated shows how social, moral and political concerns may have been absorbed into 
scientific practice. As a scientific ideology, this research topic was not only subjected to sci-
entific arguments but also nurtured by other sources. Although Muller’s paper was published 
in a scientific journal, an attentive reading of its core argument leaves no doubt as to the 
extra-scientific concerns that intervened in the construction of genetic load. 
 
Genetic Load: 
A Set of Societal Concerns Packaged up as a Scientific Inscription 
The Shaping of Genetic Load as an Ethical Argument  
 
Muller’s ambition in “Our load of mutations” is to refute the prevailing hypothesis according 
to which "mutation as a direct cause of disease is extremely rare and of little practical signif-
icance". Anterior measures of hidden variability resulted from experiments on drosophilae 
but Muller’s point is that these results cannot be extrapolated to modern humans. As pro-
gress in technology, living standards and medicine has relaxed natural selection, the human 
species has escaped its natural condition. Muller therefore dissociates the evolutionary 
model of “primitive man” from that of the “modern man”, under the assumption that the 
determinants used to predict the evolution of the human species cannot be given the same 
weight when humans are no longer immersed in nature.  
Although distinct, primitive man and modern man remain biologically bound. More 
precisely, we, modern man, are twice the product of our predecessors. We are the lineage 
descendants of our ancestors and we inherited our genetic fitness from their harsh condi-
tions of living. Their struggles, Muller argues, made our fortune. As the argument moves from 
a descriptive to an evaluative stance, the genetic load becomes the subject of an ethical dis-
cussion. Because each generation is responsible for the living conditions that influence the 
quality of the germplasm they pass on to the next, generations are not only genetically bound 
but also morally bound. Our debt to primitive man obliges us towards future man. Muller uses 
the argument of indirect reciprocity14 to assert that acting on behalf of future generations 
may be required as a generalized form of reciprocity for benefits received from previous gen-
erations. Is it moral to opt for our comfort at the cost of the fitness of future generations? Is 
it moral, asks Muller, to be “the debtors” (Muller 1950, 165) of our descendants when we are 
                                                 
13 The part in brackets is translated from the French sentence, omitted in the English version we refer 
to. 
14 This argument is now well developed in the context of intergenerational justice. See for example 
(Fotion & Jan 1997); (Ryberg & Torbjön 2004).  
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indebted to our ancestors? 15  Or do we owe to our descendants a certain “quality” of 
germplasm to supply future generations with the best genetic resources? Our current politi-
cal, technological and social choices, predicts Muller, not only put the natural dynamics of 
hard-earned selective advantage at stake but actually threaten the human species.16 If selec-
tion can no longer counteract the pressure of mutations and if these mutations are deleteri-
ous to our species, the survival of humanity is at stake. The moral tale narrated by Muller 
concludes the existence of an imminent danger that, although occurring through genetic 
mechanisms, would ultimately be due to our moral failure. 
Throughout the article, Muller insists on the scale of the problem: genetic load can only 
be apprehended through the big picture.17 A misapprehension of this scale would lead to ma-
jor flaws in reasoning. This is a failure also attributed by Muller to Malthus’ opponents, who, 
by misjudging the gravity of the modern situation, failed to comprehend that it could not be 
handled by social measures alone18 and that man’s heredity needed to be controlled through 
eugenic measures. Because what is at stake with genetic load is not simply the refutation of 
a scientific statement as announced in the introduction to the article but the extinction of 
the entire human species, the task of estimating the magnitude of the risk dictates its own 
philosophical treatment – a task well handled by Muller. To paraphrase Pascal’s wager, there 
is here an infinite to gain (enhanced humanity) and an infinite to lose (humanity itself), and 
no matter the risks of gain and loss (“even a 10% risk of extinction”), if the stake is finite 
(“purposive control over reproduction” (Muller 1950, 150) then the rational choice is to wa-
ger to gain the infinite.19  
The several pages devoted by Muller to the ethical discussion and its political implica-
tions constitute the core argument of the genetic load concept. There is a visually obvious 
parenthesis of prose in “Our load of mutations” that refers only to humans. Once Muller has 
(ethically) justified the formulation of the load in its human context, he can go back to calcu-
lating rates of evolution. And, with the formulae, the drosophilae flutter back to the paper. 
The article articulates two different concerns in two different formats: 
 
- for the drosophilae, a flat description of experimental facts interspersed with calcu-
lations; 
 
- for humans, a passage of prose dedicated to the chronicle of a death foretold. 
 
The differential use of text and formulae betrays the exceptionality of the concern for the 
human species. At this point, genetic load was not a model easily transposed to different 
species or populations: another operation was required to erase the heterogeneous roots of 
the mathematical model and render it an apparently pure scientific argument. 
                                                 
15  The term “debtor” is appropriate for such generations because, by instituting for their own 
immediate benefit ameliorative procedures which delay the attainment of equilibrium and raise the 
equilibrium level of mutant gene frequency, they transfer to their descendants a price of detriment 
which the latter must eventually pay in full.  
16 “His only connection with mankind would then be the historical one that we ourselves had after all 
been their ancestors and sponsors, and the fact that His once-human material was still used for the 
purpose of converting it, artificially, into some semblance of man” (Muller 1950, 146). 
17 There are for instance 28 occurrences of the expressions “on the whole”, “as a whole” and “the 
whole population” in the paper. 
18 These methods are “in the long run, as effective as trying to push back the flowing waters of a river 
with one's bare hands” (Muller 1950, 146). 
19 “[…] even a 10% risk of any kind of death or extinction is a very sizeable danger. Few persons would 
be free from misgivings if they had to undergo an operation, to take a trip, or to contract a disease, 
with this amount of risk” (Muller 1950, 143). 
“Genetic Load”: 
How the Architects of the Modern Synthesis Became Trapped in a Scientific Ideology 
Alexandra Soulier 
 
125 
Crow’s Equation: An Immutable Mobile 
 
It was only the equation proposed by J. Crow in 1958 that truly facilitated the circulation of 
the model in animal and human studies alike. This equation, published in a human population 
genetic study, was applied to animal models the following year. 
 
 
 
Where  is the maximum value of the fitness and  is mean fitness 
 
How much explanatory burden does this tiny set of figures carry in the concept’s fate? Let us 
count the frequency of “the genetic load” in scientific articles: used only once (Dobzhansky 
1957) between 1950 and 1958, there are 77 occurrences between 1959 and 1970 – most of 
them concerning animal studies.20 So, why would the condensation of the concept into an 
equation mark such a turning point in the scientific use of genetic load? Firstly, because an 
operational inscription is crucial to the construction of harder facts that complete a scientific 
ambition. Secondly, because, without its long justification in prose, the equation is ready to 
use in any context (human or animal) and the topic of genetic load available for experiments. 
The format of the equation erased the concern for the human species that lay at the origin 
of the model and made the genetic load operational.  
Genetic load is a mathematical model that did not fit the chronology of biology but 
fitted perfectly with the spirit of the reform eugenics group; a rather sophisticated ethical 
argument developed in the middle of a scientific paper and a calculation adjusted to the so-
cial and cultural dimensions of the human species that was extended to animal studies. Ge-
netic load is obviously the byproduct of intersecting processes but its rendering as an equa-
tion enabled its outsourced social and ethical concerns to be condensed under an operational 
format. Transformed into a scientific inscription and used in experimental models, the theme 
of genetic load gained scientific legitimacy. B. Latour (1986) developed a theoretical interest 
in the kind of objects through which many worlds and practices are re-assembled to be made 
presentable in a different setting. These objects, Latour argues, must be both transportable 
and unchangeable during transportation: they are “immutable mobiles”. Once these objects 
succeed in folding layers of scientific practices into a flat format, they are ready to circulate 
outside the laboratory in order to convince those who have not supported their birth.  
We argue that the privileged formats of genetic load – as a metaphor21 and as an equa-
tion22 – make it a topic particularly disposed to travel between the bodies of biological and 
humanist writing. More importantly, we argue that this circulation reinforced both the scien-
tific legitimacy and the political efficacy of the genetic load. 
 
- The metaphor developed in Our load of mutations “vehicles”23 the assumptions of 
the architects of the evolutionary synthesis regarding not only how evolutionary 
processes work but to what end human progress ought to tend. As such, the label 
                                                 
20 Web of Science, consulted on 07.25.13 
21 The English metaphor derives from the 16th-century Old French métaphore, which comes from the 
Latin metaphora, “carrying over”, in turn from the Greek μεταφορά (metaphorá), “transfer”.  
22 An equation is an optic device: it is “a complete hybrid (nature seen as fiction and fiction made as 
nature), with all elements made so homogeneous that it is now impossible to reshuffle them like a 
pack of cards” (Latour 1986, 8). 
23 A metaphor is described as having two parts: the tenor and the vehicle. The tenor is the subject to 
which attributes are ascribed. The vehicle is the object whose attributes are borrowed. 
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“genetic load” is anything but neutral: it implies that variation is a burden we carry 
at a time when social diversity was considered harmful for our society. The use of a 
pejorative vocabulary (e.g. mutational load or cost of selection) is crucial as it con-
veys the eugenic style of thinking; 
 
- The equation proposed shortly afterwards allows the transportation of the model 
across different fields, without mentioning its heterogeneous roots and its ideolog-
ical content. 
 
The social destiny of the concept of genetic load does not, therefore, stop with its formula-
tion as an equation but becomes all the more fascinating as the topic starts to circulate be-
tween scientific articles and humanist essays. The following section is an attempt track ge-
netic load as a central theme in the corpus of Evolutionary Humanism. Whether they express 
their thoughts in conclusive chapters of biological works or devote entire books to the soci-
etal and political implications of evolutionary studies, the architects of the synthesis demon-
strate varying commitment to the humanist cause. We are particularly interested in Julian 
Sorell Huxley and Theodosius Dobzhansky, who left a sufficient quantity of published mate-
rial to allow a fairly complete reconstitution of their humanistic theses that include the pro-
motion of the genetic load and who occupy a very different position with regard to science. 
 
- Huxley’s bibliography rehearses the double identity of an author who wrote Essays of 
a Biologist in 1923 and Essays of a Humanist in 1964. But Huxley is not only a brilliant scientist 
and an enthusiastic humanist. He also is a politician. His political career led him to become 
the first Director-General of the UNESCO in 1946. During his investiture speech, Huxley de-
fended scientific Humanism as the unique source of inspiration for effective politics. Huxley 
explained how the fact of evolutionary progress provided an objective foundation for "ide-
ology" – a term he used to denote an integrated system of morality, ritual, emotion, and 
belief. Interestingly enough, most historians of science working on Huxley reversed this con-
nection between evolution and politics and admitted that Huxley's idea of evolution was ra-
ther structured by his political commitments and his humanist aspirations.   
 
What makes Huxley’s Humanism so unique is the connection between two spheres: sci-
ence and politics; which considering his own path is not so surprising. Huxley emphasized 
that knowledge meant power of control and he was obsessed with designing a ‘technocratic 
utopianism’ (Esposito 2011) whereby the whole would prevail over the individuals. This mode 
of reasoning belongs to a history of well-intentioned plans for improving the human condi-
tion, where idealized images of social order were created and then millions of lives ruthlessly 
redesigned to match their vision, so as to finally go tragically awry (Scott 1998). Common to 
all these planning disasters is the "high-modernist ideology" that places confidence in the 
ability of science to improve every aspect of human life. A theme highly familiar to Huxley, 
whose scientific legitimacy and political status conferred him the power to promote a form 
of social order tending to excellence, where eugenics could considered a desirable mean. 
 
- Dozhansky is a prolific author. His name is associated to more than 600 writings. He 
published experimental works as well as theoretical papers, some anthropological essays 
and philosophical books – all related to the notion of evolution. An important claim in the 
definition of evolution by Dobzhansky lies in the refutation of biological reductionism: “Hu-
man evolution is the outcome of interactions between biological and cultural factors” (Dob-
zhansky 1956, 56).  But Dobzhansky worries about culture interfering with the course of evo-
lution. Dobzhansky still refers explicitly to the genetic load as an inescapable prophecy in a 
humanist opus written in 1962.  His defense of the genetic load is all the more striking given 
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that the next year, he does not credit the concept of any scientific validity in his biological 
writings (Dobzhansky 1963). In 1968, in his book written with Boesiger, he devotes one entire 
chapter to the refutation of genetic load. The arguments rely mainly on knowledge of poly-
morphism he already had gained in 1955. The difference in attitude results from a difference 
in concern, since in his humanist writings; the theme of the genetic load occupies a crucial 
position between dramatic developments about the tragic turn of human populations and a 
faithful defense of eugenics.  
 
Since both authors have developed a rich humanist perspective, where science is inter-
twined with moral and politics, although they both lead a different career and speak about 
science from a different perspective, we propose to examine Huxley and Dobzhansky’s hu-
manist essays in order to shed light on the thematic patterns that knit together scientific and 
moral, political or social representations concerning genetic load. 
 
Genetic Load: A Successful Theme of Science Fiction  
 
Whether expressed as a mathematical model or a narrative, genetic load includes fictional 
thought. Based on a series of “what ifs”, the genetic load extends the path of known evolu-
tionary processes to predict the possible future of populations. As such, humanist essays that 
elaborate on genetic load benefit from both its scientific legitimacy and its dramatic impact. 
Genetic load thus deserves to be treated as an element of science fiction, i.e. a “realistic spec-
ulation about possible future events, based solidly on adequate knowledge of the real world, 
past and present, and on a thorough understanding of the nature and significance of the 
scientific method” (Heinlein et al. 1959). These narratives are precious in the Canguilhemian 
analysis, based on the notion of ideology, as they explicitly inscribe scientific practices in the 
current representations of the society in which they were developed.  
‘Back to the Future’ 
 
The architects of the synthesis are used to time travelling. Modern synthesis bridges the gap 
between the work of experimental geneticists, naturalists, and paleontologists. Under the 
umbrella of the synthesis, the fossil record has become a major support for evolution and 
interest in the primitive stages of the human species has gained scientific value. But Evolu-
tionary Humanism goes further. In humanist essays, the picture of prehistoric men is turned 
into the hypothetical condition that preceded our corruptive modernity. Prehistory here 
plays a role analogous to the state of nature in political philosophy – a thought experiment 
unveiling an original position of man and guiding both our understanding of the present and 
ultimately our planning of the future. 
Humanists typically look back from the future to interpret present and past. Huxley sketches 
this exact movement at the end of his book, Man in the Modern World. 
 
Whether or not I have been asking you to accompany me too far into the visionary 
future, I will end this essay with a concrete suggestion for the present, backed by a 
warning from the immediate past. (Huxley 1948, 61) 
 
Several rhetorical devices settle this dialectic of time. The first time machine is time’s arrow. 
Humanists draw the direction of evolution on a “natural history”, where the impulse of both 
the profusion of mutations and natural selection operate as a motor of history. As long as 
selection lowers the pressure of mutation, a sense of direction is can be traced (Huxley 1956, 
105) – connecting past, present and future. This connection is essential as it allows us to 
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understand the present in light of the past and to plan the future according to our action in 
the present. 
The second time machine is the scenario. In the scenarios that proliferate in Evolution-
ary Humanism,24 present and future both determine each other: the future depends on our 
present behavior and the vision of the future shapes our action today. As an illustration, Hux-
ley masters the art of script writing when he describes and combines three possible futures 
– each one being the product of our present way of dealing with genetic load (Huxley 1948, 
50-3). The most desirable future depends on our current determination to create a social en-
vironment favorable to the expression of desirable genetic qualities. Although the selection 
of the most favored traits is in itself a somewhat arbitrary decision based on the ideals of the 
era in question,25 the pressure of selection is in fine favorable as it promotes standardization 
and increases the chance of equity among the future members of the population. We are not 
a million miles away from the standardized melanogaster here. And, de facto, Huxley sets up 
the experimental geneticist as a model for this operation of standardization.26 
Based on their scenarios, humanists take up the old idea that society needs to be man-
aged through scientific planning.27 Planning presents a way to travel both through time di-
mensions and from science to power. Planning therefore reveals the true mission of science, 
which is to increase “both comprehension and control” (Huxley 1964, 103). Using planning 
as a third time machine, genetic load becomes the perfect narrative through which to call for 
responsibility towards the future and motivate political action. 
‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility’ 
 
Scientists have a duty to enlighten politics so as to promote a social environment which con-
nects our social realm with our genetic makeup. This is the only way to counteract the cor-
ruptive modernity and reposition humanity on its path towards endless progress. Knowledge 
calls for action. The architects of the synthesis cannot restrain their views to the purely sci-
entific realm because the general knowledge they have acquired may (and therefore should) 
benefit humanity. Paving the way for the future experts who would soon invade political in-
stitutions and ground policy-making in scientific knowledge (Jasanoff 1998), the contributors 
to Evolutionary Humanism are first and foremost scientists who feel obliged towards human-
ity by virtue of their superior knowledge. As Muller argues: 
 
It is the responsibility of those who already have knowledge of the genetic facts to be 
prime movers in driving home an adequate realization of them among both the lay and 
medical public, and among all groups concerned with social matters, until appropriate 
changes are adopted in their daily practices and precepts. (Muller 1950, 163) 
 
                                                 
24 “They (The Architects of the Synthesis) shared an obsession with the future of humankind; an ob-
session that was often translated into speculations about possible future scenarios” Esposito (2011). 
25 “Even if we imagine we are working to absolute genetic standards, we are in reality thinking of them, 
albeit unconsciously, in relation to some ideal environment of the future, or to the needs and realities 
of the present social environment, or, very frequently, to our bias and a priori views about this present 
environment and how our opinion it ought to be changed” (Huxley 1948, 48). 
26 “[…] to disentangle the effects of nature from those of nurture in so far as we follow the footstep 
of the geneticist and equalize environment” (Huxley 1948, 52). 
27 “Man needs to use his best efforts of knowledge and imagination to use a system of thought and 
belief which will provide both a supporting framework for his present existence, an ultimate or ideal 
goal for its future development as a species, and a guide and directive for practical action and plan-
ning” (Huxley 1964, 77). 
 
“Genetic Load”: 
How the Architects of the Modern Synthesis Became Trapped in a Scientific Ideology 
Alexandra Soulier 
 
129 
The theme of responsibility is also pervasive within the argument of the genetic load. As Dob-
zhansky puts it: “Man is not just an overgrown Drosophila” (Dobzhansky 1962, 148). Evolu-
tion has culminated in the human species28 to the point that humans have escaped the natu-
ral order and are now in charge of their existence. The Rubicon has been crossed: humans 
occupy a chosen place in nature, a place actually above nature, and this dominant position 
confers upon them a mission: 
 
Man's destiny is to be the sole agent for the future evolution of this planet. He is the 
highest dominant type to be produced by over two and a half billions of years of the 
slow biological improvement effected by the blind opportunistic workings of natural 
selection; if he does not destroy himself, he has at least an equal stretch of evolution-
ary time before him to exercise his agency. (Huxley 1964, 81-2) 
 
(Humans are) called upon to participate in the construction of the best thinkable uni-
verse. (Dobzhansky 1973, 115-6) 
 
The human species is not an object that humanists are interested in but matter they propose 
to work on by taking charge of its heredity. 
‘A Brave New World’ 
 
Architects of the synthesis rely on their genetic knowledge to prove that eugenics is both 
necessary and omnipotent. The list of “genetic disabilities” (Huxley 1964, 256-7), whose bur-
den should be removed from humanity, includes pathologies of diverse severity, vague cate-
gories (“some mental defect”) and conditions whose genetic conditioning has not yet been 
proven (“some kinds of sexual deviation”). Huxley also reports the successes of human be-
havioral geneticists in proving that intelligence but also “persistence, willingness to work, 
originality, creativity, leadership, ability to get along well with others, and plain human de-
cency” (Huxley 1964, 40) are grounded in the genetic endowment. Eugenics should there-
fore draw on genetics knowledge to re-shape humanity and allow human enhancement. Pos-
itive eugenics can favor genetic susceptibility for curiosity and improve future scientists. Eu-
genics can favor creative imagination and improve future artists. Eugenics can even favor 
devotion and improve future saints (Huxley 1964, 259)! 
Two complementary modes of action are usually proposed: euthenics which “pro-
poses to work with existing genetic equipment and to create environments in which the best 
potentialities will be brought to realization” (Dunn & Dobzhansky 1949, 83); and eugenics 
which “aspires to alter the genetics of human populations and mankind” (Dunn & Dobzhan-
sky 1949, 85-6). Eugenics exists under two forms: 
 
Positive eugenics programs urge people who are regarded as carriers of desirable gene 
combinations to undertake the responsibilities of parenthood. [...] More enthusiasm 
has been shown in many places for negative eugenics, which urges elimination of un-
desirable genes by discouraging or making it impossible for persons who show the ef-
fects of such genes to have children. Since voluntary abstention from parenthood may 
be difficult, sterilization for individuals who are likely to have severe hereditary defects 
is recommended. (Dunn & Dobzhansky 1949, 83)  
 
                                                 
28 “The biological evolution has transcended itself in the human revolution. A new level or dimension 
has been reached. The light of the human spirit has begun to shine. The Humanum is born” (Dobzhan-
sky 1967, 58). 
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Scientists are not simply interested in designing eugenic plans. They are enthusiastic about 
it. The rhetorical use of emotion in the architects’ writings is, in itself, a further indication that 
the concept of genetic load encompasses sorrows and visions that exceed the scientific ar-
gument. In Our load of mutations, Muller’s prophetic insights about the extinction of the hu-
man species turned him into a Cassandra of modernity. The insertion of drama or joy into 
scientific accounts is all the more surprising given that the scientists are themselves wary of 
it. Dobzhansky is, for instance, suspicious about emotions that would harm his argumenta-
tion. He prefers the term ‘genetic elimination’ to ‘genetic death’ because of the latter’s emo-
tional impact,29 but at the same time does not hesitate to embark on colorful descriptions of 
the genetic load that are themselves relatively emotionally loaded. The acceptance of emo-
tion on the one hand when it is refused on the other can be interpreted as a shift in perspec-
tive. Genetic load threatens the human species whereas eugenics only threatens individuals. 
Or, as Huxley emphasizes, the scale according to which problems are considered impacts 
their moral examination. How much does the evanescent present weigh in the horizon of 
evolution? 
 
All the objections of principle to a policy of positive eugenics fall to the ground when 
the subject is looked at in the embracing perspective of evolution, instead of in limited 
perspective of population-genetics or the short-term perspective of existing socio-po-
litical organization. (Huxley 1964, 282) 
 
Population genetics, the biological basis for genetic load, is itself disqualified to the benefit 
of a more poetic vision of evolution open to the infinite.30 Genetic load is a scientific fiction 
that relies on the ‘truth effects’ of science (methodology, experiments, and formulae) but 
supports aesthetic, moral and political commitments. The history of the genetic load pro-
vides a basis for further discussion of the connection between scientific claims and policy-
making. 
 
Science and Policy 
 
The Translation of Genetics into the Promotion of Eugenics 
 
The genetic load model is an argument that connects genetics and eugenics. This connection 
is not easy to define as eugenics itself varies in status and may be considered by the same 
author as a religion,31 a social science,32 a methodological effort to bridge social research and 
                                                 
29 (Dobzhansky 1962, 290): Muller (1950, 1954, and other writings) refers to the elimination of detri-
mental genetic variants as genetic death. I prefer a less dramatic term – genetic elimination. […] “Ge-
netic death” is obviously an emotionally loaded phrase. It invites misunderstanding. Genetic death 
does not always produce cadaver. 
30 “Most important of all, (Evolutionary Humanism) brings together the and largely unutilized re-
sources of our knowledge, and orders them to provide a new vision of human destiny, illuminating in 
every aspect, from the broad and enduring sweep of cosmic process to the present-day politics, from 
the planetary web of world ecology to the individual lives entangled in it, from the dip roots of man's 
past to the dawning possibilities of his far future” (Huxley 1964, 78). 
31 “Once the full implications of evolutionary biology are grasped, eugenics will inevitably become part 
of the religion of the future, or of whatever complex of sentiments may in the future take the place of 
organized religion” (Huxley 1948, 28). 
32 “Eugenics is not, as some of its devotees have unconsciously assumed, a special branch of natural 
science: it is a branch of social science. […] True that it aims at the improvement of the human race by 
means of the improvement of its genetic qualities. But any improvement of the sort can be made 
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social reform,33 or an application of natural science.34 When considered as an applied science, 
scientists are fully aware of the risks pertaining to the translation from science to its applica-
tion. Dobzhansky, for instance, is lucid about the potential collapse of Darwinism with cur-
rent ideologies (like colonialism35). He details some precedents of “a manifold misuse of bi-
ology for purposes of political propaganda” (Dobzhansky 1956, 57). In his analysis, Dobzhan-
sky is particularly concerned by the value-laden notion of ‘progress’, which may be vulnerable 
to a political hold. This point is crucial because, although the notion of ‘progress’ violates the 
taboo against introducing value judgments into science, it remains a prevailing theme in syn-
thesis writings (Greene 1990). Historians of science explain this widespread use differently. 
Esposito (2011) relies on an historical analysis of post-war, challenging times when he sus-
pects that “this definition of evolutionary progress was especially important […] because 
the humankind’s future progress was not guaranteed”. Ruse (1988) grounds progressivism 
in psychological reasons: since, in science, competitive research yields to cumulative pro-
gress, scientists consider themselves the product of an improving humanity and are thus pre-
disposed to believe in progress. When we turn to the texts in which the architects of the 
synthesis directly address the origin of the notion of ‘progress’, we encounter a spiral argu-
ment, where factual evolution is believed to lead to the emergence of human conscience, 
thus asserting that subjective values and factual progress advance together.36 The precious 
dialectic hereof produced turns out to be fruitful for both scientific and humanist writings, 
as it inscribes both missions towards the same horizon: the enhancement of humanity. 
Faith in progress, from which the concept of the genetic load emerges, is a gateway 
for the intrusion of social concerns into scientific claims. Through the notion of progress, so-
cial values guide what is considered the telos of humanity. According to Dobzhansky, how-
ever, qualified biologists are immune to the misappropriation of progressive evolutionary 
views (Dobzhansky 1956, 59). Science is pure. And this view extends to the translation of 
science provided it is monitored by scientists. When Dunn and Dobzhansky wonder about 
the conditions under which scientific knowledge is ready to be applied, they argue solely on 
the basis of intrinsically scientific criteria (Dunn & Dobzhansky 1949, 83). If the scientific 
knowledge is advanced, as they believe genetics to be after its rapid progress in the 1930’s 
and 1940’s, this knowledge can be turned into actions. In this argument, maturity of science 
is evaluated endogenously and the process is assumed to be informed and guided by 
                                                 
realized in a certain kind of social environment, so that eugenics is inevitably particular aspect of the 
study of man in society” (Huxley 1948, 31). 
33 “The next step for eugenics, as I urged at the beginning of this essay, is a methodological one. We 
eugenists must familiarize ourselves with the outlook and the concepts of sociology, with the tech-
nique and practice of social reform; for they are indispensable part of the machinery we need to realize 
our aims” (Huxley 1948, 62). 
34 “The thread running through most of these essays is the attempt to discover and apply in certain 
fields as much as possible of this scientific conception to several different fields of reality” (Huxley 
1923, XIV). 
35 “The tenor of the theory of natural selection suited the intellectual climate of the second half of the 
nineteenth century remarkably well. […] With colonial empires abuilding and with imperial nations 
preparing to dispute each other’s claims to world mastery, it was a comforting thought that when the 
strong exploit or oppress the weak they are merely obeying natural laws and striving towards ‘pro-
gress’. […] Darwin’s theory was good biology which was perverted by others to support bad sociol-
ogy” (Dobzhansky 1956, 59). 
36 “What we have found is that there exists a certain general direction of movement in the evolution 
of living things; towards the increase of certain of their properties. But when we make a further anal-
ysis, we find that movement in this direction is a movement towards realization of the things judged 
by the human mind to have value (increase of power, knowledge, of purpose, of emotion, of harmony 
[…]). What is important is that the human idea of value finds its external counterpart in an actual 
historical direction in phenomena, and that each becomes important because of the relationship” 
(Huxley 1923, 59-60). 
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scientists themselves. Society is considered a pure recipient and societal forces can neither 
shape the orientations of science, nor oppose any resistance to scientific imports. 
This comprehension of the translation and application of science has changed over re-
cent decades. The notion of “scientific ideology”, in particular, challenges this vision of an 
immaculate science.  
 
The Model of Scientific Ideology vs. the Model of Co-Production 
 
Science, according to Canguilhem, embraces a cyclic temporality, where transitions from one 
theory to another are phases susceptible to incorporate extra-scientific concerns and thus 
convey ideological expressions. The identification and deciphering of ‘scientific ideologies’ is 
thus particularly helpful in informing our critical approach to the relationship between sci-
ence and society, by highlighting the themes and patterns that, throughout the history of 
science, connected scientific practices and social concerns. 
Since Canguilhem’s work on ‘scientific ideology’, several disciplines in science studies 
have shown how social, political, and cultural values affect scientific research and how this, 
in turn, affects society, politics and culture. The concept of co-production developed in the 
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) is particularly interesting from this point of 
view. Co-production is shorthand for “the proposition that the ways in which we know and 
represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we 
chose to live in” (Jasanoff 2004, 3). With the model of co-production, sociology of science 
moves from extreme technological determinism and social constructivism, to a more sys-
temic understanding of how technology and society ‘co-produce’ each other.  
Contrarily to the historical concept of ‘scientific ideology’, the sociological framework 
of co-production can be applied to understand reciprocal relations in the making, between 
science and society. Other than questions of temporality, there are at least two profound 
differences between the two concepts that underline contrasting views on both science and 
society.  
 
- First, as a sensitizing concept, the idiom of co-production looks at four themes: “the 
emergence and stabilization of new techno-scientific objects and framings, the resolution of 
scientific and technical controversies; the processes by which the products of techno-science 
are made intelligible and portable across boundaries; and the adjustment of science’s cultural 
practices in response to the contexts in which science is done” (Jasanoff 2004, 72). These are 
sensitive places to investigate, along the scientific process, how scientific experts and other 
groups co-generate new knowledge and technologies rather than specific phases in the the-
oretical cycle of science. When ‘co-production’ emphasizes the practicality of science, ‘scien-
tific ideology’ relies firstly on the examination of its inner theoretical content, as expressed 
within scientific concepts.  
 
- Second, ‘co-production’ is functionally comparable to the concepts of positive feed-
back or co-evolution, which describe how two or more variables of a system affect and es-
sentially create each other. In this systematic framework, all scientific claims incorporate so-
cial factors and are subject to negotiation. The notion of ‘scientific ideology’, on the contrary, 
introduces a dichotomy between ideological and no ideological science. Canguilhem thus 
maintains a place for a substantially defined scientific rationality and even uses the inherently 
normative history of science to “judge” the past of science (Canguilhem 1970, 13). Going back 
to the case study of genetic load, one can however ask how to disentangle, historically speak-
ing, ideological genetics from ‘pure’ genetics and if this proposition would even make sense. 
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As our vision of the relation of science and society has evolved, there may not be a 
place any longer for the notion of scientific ideology in the tools box of the historian of sci-
ence. The emphasis on the practicality of science – significant enough to lead to developing 
subfields of philosophy and history of science in practices (Ankeny, Chang, Boumans, & Boon 
2011; Leonelli 2012; Müller-Wille & Charmantier 2012) –, and maybe more importantly, the sys-
tematic approach that enables historians to interpret a seminal debate about experimental 
science in relation with its political fallout without judgment as to the intrinsic scientific value 
of the arguments involved (Shapin & Schaffer 1985), may prevent from an approach that 
seeks for ‘scientific’ concepts that betray the penetration of ideology in critical theoretical 
phases. 
However, we argue that the heuristics attached to scientific ideology remains fruitful 
to discuss the framework of co-production and its potential pitfall: noetic flatness. If science 
and society co-produce each other equally, the justification for maintaining the boundary be-
tween them dissolves. Co-production, if used to broadly or uncritically, thus leads to a radical 
discourse of relativism and to the loss of scientific rationality. In contrast with this systematic 
framework, the Canguilhemian approach invites historians to identify and decipher scientific 
concepts where extra-scientific elements permeate scientific rationality, thus maintaining 
boundary-work within the process. Canguilhem’s appreciation of the intricacy of science and 
non-science remains subtle throughout his work. First, Canguilhem recognizes the decisive 
role of valuation within science (Canguilhem 1966). Second, his judgment on otherwise 
wrong theories includes the appreciation of potential beneficial effects in the course of sci-
ence. That was for example the case for vitalism, considered as an epistemological obstacle 
to the development of better theoretical systems in explaining biological phenomena, that 
however kept biologists’ concepts open to the uniqueness of the phenomena they are de-
signed to understand and that did warn them against the reductionist pretentions of suc-
cessful mechanistic theories (Canguilhem 1977). Canguilhem’s critics against vitalism are as 
such rather nuanced. It is thus not surprising that the concept of scientific ideology inherits 
from the same kind of ambivalence, being “at the same time an obstacle and a condition of 
possibility […] for the constitution of science” (Canguilhem 1988, 38). As such, Canguilhem’s 
lesson may well lead to a nuanced understanding of science rather than to a clear-cut sepa-
ration of ideology and genuine science or to the loss in significance of scientific rationality. 
 
Conclusion: Past and Present 
 
Genetic load history is intriguing because its ideological content nurtures its scientific fate. It 
is also alarming because this specific ideological content touches the darkest hours of eugen-
ics. Based on our examination of genetic load as a scientific ideology, we conclude by indicat-
ing how some ideological elements that allowed the genetic load to persist as a relevant topic 
of population genetics beyond the expiration of its theoretical basis can still be observed in 
up-to-date science.  
In an evidence-based movement, where some knowers are privileged over others in 
policy decision-making, the legitimacy derived from experimental fact is key. This was true at 
the time of emergence of the genetic load model and is still true today. The ‘from cells to 
society’ approach, recently developed in a public health context, constitutes an attempt to 
anchor social interventions in molecular knowledge. The growth of the discipline of environ-
mental epigenetics illustrates such a program. Epigenetics is commonly defined as the “the 
structural adaptation of chromosomal regions so as to register, signal or perpetuate altered 
activity states” (Bird 2007). Put more simply, epigenetics refers to those mechanisms of gene 
regulation that do not involve changes in DNA sequence. The discipline therefore brings de-
bates about soft inheritance back to the fore (Meloni 2015). If material and social factors 
seem massively engaged in producing aspects of our own biology, then social control may 
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allow us to take charge of our own heredity. Here we are, more than half a century after the 
genetic load model was formulated, on the basis of entirely different claims, with the same 
proposal to enhance social progress and population health via the manipulation of our most 
intimate chemistry. 
A significant body of scholarship has already started to outline the implications of the 
anticipated translation of environmental epigenetics to social measures. In this matter, the 
political application of scientific claims is a double-edged sword. Showing how acquired traits 
can be inherited may, hopefully, serve to promote social reform provided social investment 
proves worthwhile by the passing on of good habits across generations. However, if bad 
habits become bad biology, and the scars of past exposures and traumas give rise to ideas of 
specific groups being too damaged to be rescued, epigenetics may well become the basis for 
reproducing and consolidating structural differences in society – class, gender, and race 
(Katz 2013; Mansfield 2012). Whether or not the translation of epigenetic into public health 
follows one set of values or another is not up to the scientists to decide but will eventually 
depend on the broader socio-political context in which science circulates (Dupras 2014). Alt-
hough every era tends to assert that “its science somehow levitates above the social, eco-
nomic, political forces of the day – and is free from such immersion” (Duster 2015, 22), scien-
tists are always caught in the social fabric of their times and the potential translation of sci-
entific claims into policy-making adds thick layers imbued with social meaning and power to 
the investigation. A specific interest in the application of science might even shape the pur-
suit of scientific endeavors. Because intervention might well be the telos that orients the 
generation of knowledge, there are ‘political epistemologies’ at stake in the most experi-
mental settings. In the end scientific claims cannot be separated from their ideological sur-
roundings. 
Eugenicists seemed to have the weight of rigorous, quantitative, and thus scientific 
evidence on their side when, in actual fact, their scientific claims were controversial and were 
ultimately invalidated. To those with economic and social power and imbued with the new 
spirit of scientific planning, the tale of the eugenic load offered a rational approach to dealing 
with social problems. But it turned out that those social concerns had, to a great extent, led 
to the construction of the concept of genetic load (and not the other way around). The way 
in which society shapes scientific endeavor is not obvious. The pursuit of science presup-
poses metaphysical, political and moral commitments, such as those identified in the con-
struction of the genetic load model. But scientific ambition for objectivity overturns these 
commitments and strips them away. Advocates of Evolutionary Humanism were thus re-
duced to claiming the scientific sanction of evolutionary biology for values that originated 
elsewhere and could be argued for in the language of ethics and politics. 
The persistence of the concept of genetic load results from its position in limbo be-
tween a scientific argument and a political argument. Recent developments in science result 
from the same kind of ambiguity. To cite just one example, the rise of environmental epige-
netics is not only playing an important role in shaping the contours of socio-biological bound-
aries, but doing so, it also advocates in favor of certain conceptions of justice (Loi 2013). Be-
cause of the weight given to scientific claims and, in particular, to experimental evidence in 
policy-making – or, to put it differently, “when men define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences” (Thomas 1928, 571) – we must remain aware of the fact that laboratories 
are not places outside the world but reflect our own struggles within society. This might well 
be the lesson of Canguilhem today. 
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